Diversified trading networks have recently drawn a great deal of attention. In the process, the importance of diversity has perhaps been overemphasized. Using the trade in port wine from Portugal to Britain as an example, this essay attempts to show how a market once dominated by general, diversified traders was taken over by dedicated specialists whose success might almost be measured by the degree to which they rejected diversification to form a dedicated "commodity chain." The essay suggests that this strategy was better able to handle matters of quality and the specialized knowledge that port wine required. The essay also highlights the question of power in such a chain. Endemic commodity-chain struggles are clearest in the vertical brand war that broke out in the nineteenth century and which, by concentrating power, marked the final stage in the trade's transformation from network to vertical integration.
nineteenth century, in terms of export volume, the highpoint of the Companhia's achievement, in the last decade of the eighteenth century, was not equalled until the twentieth. 14 
Peculiarities of port
Wine was subject not only to the stern hand of regulation, but as also to the capricious whims of consumer fashions which may, on the one hand, demand consistent quality while, on the other, inconsistently changing the notion of what constitutes quality. To a significant degree, then, producers faced a moving target. They faced, it moreover, with a highly unpredictable weapon. As Adam Smith noted, wine is an awkward commodity. The same grapes grown in different regions--or even different parts of the same vineyard--will produce quite distinct wines. Moreover, the same grapes in the same spot will produce quite different wines from year to year depending on such unfathomable variables as the weather. Equally, once made, wine continues to change. Consequently, filling repeat orders for the "same" wine or "similar quality" is a Heraclitan if not Herculean labour. 15 Wines produced in extremely hot regions like the Douro can be particularly fussy. Grapes in such conditions develop a very high sugar content, making the wine unstable and ready, if provoked, to turn into vinegar. The addition of brandy--the process of "fortification"--helped stabilize the wine for transport it was claimed. 16 (It is not clear when the convention of fortifying port with significant amounts of brandy began, probably in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Certainly, the practice was well established by the middle of the century. 17 ) Brandy may have simplified transportation, but it added other complications. It takes time for the brandy to be absorbed in the wine. Until it is, the wine can be harsh and crude. Thus, the addition of brandy, on the one hand, made it harder to pass young wines along to 14 In 1801, 78,606 pipes of port were exported, a figure not surpassed until 1918, when in a post-war boom, 82,914 pipes were exported. (See Martins, Memória, quadro 66.) A pipe of wine contained 128 imperial gallons. 15 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York, 1937, first published 1776), 156. Despite the variability, customers asked for "similar style," "same as last," and even "identically the same as before," stipulations, which," one letter writer protests, " we cannot after this length of time answer for." HoS: letterbook, Sandeman & Co to Sandeman (London) , August 10, 1824. For the challenge of quality in wine see Alessandro Stanziani, "La Construction de la Qualité du Vin, 1880 Vin, -1914 Lisbon reported the addition of significant amounts of brandy to white port, as if the practice was new enough to be unfamiliar to the English. National Archives, Kew, England, SP 389/31 105. By 1754, however, the practice of adding wine during vinification was well established. In a celebrated exchange of letters, exporters and their agents in the Douro argued over how much brandy to add. That brandy would be added was taken as given. See English Factory, Novas Instrucoens.
consumers, raising inventories and with them the overall cost of doing business. On the other hand, by enabling transportation, brandy allowed links up the chain to pass the wine, and so the cost of holding the wine, down the chain. Fortification further complicated the negotiations between links because it took quite skilled palates to assess the potential of young wines. The following note from a representative of
Offley & Co. in the late eighteenth century, in response to a retailer's complaint about wine, captures the problem for both distributors and retailers:
It almost needless for us to observe to you that port wines owing to the increase demand for these two or three years past have come over newer than formerly and of course it required longer keeping. The wines you mentioned could only at present be fit to put in the bottle not to use. We therefore persuade ourselves that the judgement found was premature ... We therefore request of you to suspend your opinion until they have had more time to mature.
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The changing character of the wine and the knowledge required to assess future quality and set current prices made it hard for honest merchants to deal with inexperienced clients. Equally, it made it easy for unscrupulous merchants to cheat unsuspecting clients. In both cases, the nature of the wine put a premium on experience and knowledge in the chain.
19

Looking at links
The port commodity chain developed in response to the politics of the eighteenth century; the complexity of the product; the geographical, social, and cultural distance between producers and consumers; and the transformation that skill and time effected on the wine as it crossed that distance. As the journey from grape to glass became increasingly regulated and standardized, the chain it travelled also standardized taking, more or less, the following form. The wine was made in the upper Douro River valley by predominantly Portuguese farmers or lavradores. In spring, it changed hands at an annual wine fair and passed downriver to exporters in the entrepôts of Porto (which gave its name to the wine) and Vila Nova de Gaia, on the north and south banks of the Douro's Atlantic estuary. Here the exporters (predominantly British) stored and aged the wine for a couple of years before preparing it for export (by adding brandy and blending different lots) to their wholesale clients (predominantly in Britain). British importers--wine merchants, innkeepers, and hoteliers--would then sell port in barrels, bottles, or glasses to consumers, often after a little blending of their own. Each of these groups--lavradores, exporters, importers and retailers--came to represent enduring links, chained to one another and to specific places--the Douro, 1850, 8e. 19 In noting that the commodity played a significant part in shaping the chain, the paper might seem on themes made prominent by Actor Network Theory. There is little more than coincidence in this. Indeed, by pointing to the role of international diplomacy and state fiscal regulation in the chain's development, the argument, pace some of that school, suggests that such networks cannot usefully be in terms of the micro-actors in the chain alone.
Porto, and Britain--in the port commodity chain. To understand the chain as a whole, we need to look at each in turn. (While we can examine links separately, as this section attempts to do, we need to remember that the challenge for the chain as a whole was to articulate knowledge and skills so widely separated into a workable continuum and a viable product, making disparate links work as a unit.) As we do we shall see, besides these canonical points and the tensions they exerted on one another to straighten the chain, some less visible intermediaries who played important stabilizing roles, bridging gaps in social, human, and financial capital between the canonical links.
The Douro
The Douro wines that shipped from Porto were initially the product of monasteries and absentee aristocratic landowners, whose vineyards clustered close to the cities in what was an otherwise the rugged, roadless region of the upper Douro valley. 20 As the market for port developed in Britain, viticulture spread, both geographically and demographically. Simultaneously the region, whose rocky land was inhospitable to most crops other than vines, became increasingly monocultural in every way:
the wine and the knowledge that came from making it developed around a single, highly distinct market.
The effect was self-reinforcing: participants grasped the port commodity chain ever more tightly; strong ties became stronger; weak ones, only weaker.
To meet growing demand in the eighteenth century, lavradores were drawn to the Douro and more land put under vines and brought within the demarcation. Between 1770 and 1821, the number of lavradores grew from just under 2,000 to almost 4,000. 21 Few of these exported, however, and the Companhia, constantly suspicious of engrossing, forestalling, and futures contracting by exporters, worked hard to inhibit any kind of enduring relationships between lavradores and the exporters. To this end, it created a spot market in the Douro, an annual fair in early spring before which no one could buy or sell and during which lavradores had to accept the first offer made at the set price or taxa. Both buyers and sellers regularly outmaneuvered these restrictions. In particular, powerful lavradores and those with high-quality wines (the two classes did not necessarily overlap) built long-term relations with particular exporters, made contracts in advance of the harvest, and received payments under the The Oratório, which could hardly describe wine as its central concern, sold almost exclusively to Hunt & Co, from the 1780s to the 1830s. The most enduring connection of Sandeman & Co. after it set up in 1814, by contrast, was a secular and dedicated viticulturalist, Braz Gonçalves Pereira, whose reputation was built neither on his extensive landholding, his political influence, nor his social status, but on the quality of his wine and his commitment to the port trade. As this suggests and as we shall see in a moment, between 1770 and 1814 the trade became increasingly the domain of such dedicated practitioners. Outside this elite, whether sacred or secular, life for most lavradores was significantly tougher.
As the region increasingly specialized, the dependence of the majority on the port wine system was profound, but their grasp on the chain itself was tenuous. forced to sell to the Companhia (and so received no premium over the set taxa), five sold no wine at all, and twenty-two percent of the wine produced found no buyer. The year 1821 was exceptional. Stocks were low and the wine was particularly good. In 1816, when market conditions were poor, 138
lavradores offered wine, 108 were left with surplus, thirty-four had to sell to the Companhia, twenty-nine sold no wine at all, and twenty-nine percent of the wine found no buyer.
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For the unattached suppliers, there were few alternative legal markets--or even illegal ones, as roads in Portugal developed very late and the river was closely controlled by the Companhia. Moreover, even could they be reached, the wine priced itself out of most table-wine markets. So the predominantly small growers, whose numbers grew in good times and whose immiseration grew in bad, formed a "reserve army" whose members might or might not be called up in any particular year (and whose overproduction could, from the exporters' perspective, usefully encumber the Companhia). 27 The strengthening chain demanded commitment, but did not necessarily reward it. Many of the lavradores were more involuntarily welded than willingly wedded to the system.
Broker links
A reliably large pool of surplus wine provided little incentive for backward integration, consequently very few exporters were involved in production. 28 As a result, there was not only a division of labor but also a division of knowledge between the Douro and Porto. The British exporters--expatriates, few of whom were ever wholly easy in Portugal--seldom went to the Upper Douro except at the time of the wine 25 Only one supplied in every year; that was Braz Gonçalves Pereira, mentioned above. 26 RCV: Livros do Arrolomento, 1816 and 1821. 27 As James Simpson (personal communication), points out, the very smallest growers can be thought of as the very first link in the chain. They supplied either baskets of grapes ("cestos de uvas") or small amounts of wine ("vinhos à bica") and their access to the chain was controlled by the lavradores and comissários (see below fair. That was too short and too hectic to allow serious assessment of the wines on offer and of the lavradores offering. For the chain to work, buyers at the wine fair needed access to local knowledge to assess availability and reliability before making irrevocable purchases. 29 Consequently, there was a place in the chain for intermediaries, a role filled by the "comissários" or "brokers." These Douro-based Portuguese moved agilely between town and country, supervising the flow of wine down the Douro, cash back up, and a copious flow of communications in both directions. They helped circumvent the strict spot market that the Companhia sought, but in so doing, they helped sustain the same interest that the Companhia pursued, the long-term survival of the port chain.
Brokers are fairly commonplace in wine regions, yet the Douro brokers are interestingly distinct in ways that reflect the linear chain in which they participated, the social relations of the Douro, and the competitive knowledge of a complex system of production that they represented. 30 Where brokers usually work in networks of multiple suppliers and clients, often buying on speculation and selling when a suitable buyer can be found, Douro comissários tied themselves to the fortunes of one exporter and had to be pushed to look for new suppliers. Further, rather than buying on their own account, they bought on behalf of their particular exporter. For this, they received a commission on each pipe of wine, but as far as the firms' accounts reveal no salary. Annual purchases (and hence commissions) could fluctuate dramatically, so rewards for loyalty were uncertain. loyalties lay and worried whether they would reveal its excess payments. Having piously cautioned the comissários to have care for their souls when they gave testimony, the exporter was clearly relieved when the comissários inculpated the lavradores but not the firm.
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It was probably not only the ability to broker wine alone that tied Comissários to exporters, but also the ability to broker power in the Douro. Comissários determined whose samples were tasted, who found a buyer for their wine, who was paid beyond the taxa, whose wine received preferential treatment on the voyage down the Douro, and who might be pursued by the Companhia. They were able to favor their neighbors (and thus assure the prosperity of their district) and to impoverish those they disliked. In a region of endemic surpluses, few contracts, and quick and steep drops from plenty to want, such a position, bridging quite diverse geographical and social locations, was undoubtedly powerful. This power was supported by the exporters, who had much more financial but far less social capital than the comissários. By delegating power to the brokers, the exporters got access to essential local knowledge and connections while simultaneously keeping these from rivals firms. These reciprocal interests and complementary assets helped forge less visible links that connected the chain from Douro to Porto while limiting the appetite of these key participants, the comissários, to develop alternative networks.
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In all, the supply end of the port commodity chain can, from a distance assume the pastoral hue of market-driven relations between town and country, negotiated in an archetypal fair as buyers and sellers higgle over price. In fact, relations were far more complex. In some cases, quite strong bonds developed between town and country, giving exporters confident access to good wines and some lavradores enduring access to the lucrative British market. In many other cases, suppliers had to depend on luck and local patronage. In both cases, comissários played an easily overlooked yet critical part, undermining the purity of the market while increasing the viability of the chain. If the Companhia, with its abstract regulatory powers, helped forge the formal links in the chain around the spot market, the comissários, Table 4 , showing the average number of pipes exported each year over ten-year periods by each of these firms, indicates the relative strengths of each before the blockade and afterwards. had to fight to uphold its own interest in wine against the inclinations of the network. In 1821, in a notable departure from business decorum, a junior partner in the London house dismissed the profits the house made from the wine business (which it handled on commission) as "piddling" and barely able to cover an "extra clerk's salary." 44 The small rewards that the network got from the wine were then compared to the major value that the fish business contributed. Following this exchange, Hunt & Co.
more or less put the wine business on hold for a few years, living off what the network deemed profitable and barely exporting 100 pipes a year where once it had regularly shipped 2,000. Like Warre, when it tried to return it found the market less favorable to its networked strategy.
Offley & Co, the dominant British exporter in the late eighteenth century, also dealt in imports as well as wine exports. Holding close to the Methuen treaty, it had long accepted consignments of wool and exported wine. As the wool market declined, it turned to cotton goods. Though these imports came on commission, the obligations incurred could be cumbersome. Not only did Offley & Co. have to deal with innumerable Portuguese complaints about shoddy goods and to pursue bad debts, but it also had to wrestle with the customs house over goods held on bond. At the end of the siege of Porto during the Civil War, when all its attention was needed to deal with the newly reopened wine supply line to England, it found its limited personnel dealing with protracted and distracting claims for cotton goods damaged in a bombardment. Furthermore, like Hunt & Co., Offley & Co. also owned shares in ships, which again prejudiced its wine business on occasion as customers complained that their wine was traveling on slower or more expensive ships to favor Offley's shipping interests. Nevertheless, Offley & Co. was much closer than Hunt & Co. to being a dedicated wine trader. In 1779, for example, the wine 43 The exchange rate fluctuated around 5s 6d or 66 pence to the mil reis, so four mil reis came to a little more than one pound. See Fisher, The Portugal Trade, appendix VI. All the Porto houses dealt in bills of exchange to some degree, but as this was necessary to deal with fluctuations in exchange rates and shortages in coin and gold as well as the demands of long-term credit, it can hardly be thought of as diversification. 44 AFF: Hunt & Co., incoming letters, letter from Newman & Co., March 13, 1821. account delivered 55,246 mil reis to profit and loss; the commission account merely 2,555 mil reis, and for the period 1779-1807 commission contributed only 2.5 percent of wine's payments to P&L. 45 There are undoubtedly several reasons for the success of Offley & Co. in the port trade, but its relative specialization, compared to competitors like Warre, is certainly one. Indeed, it dominated the trade until, on the one hand, its commitment to the trade wavered and it diversified more, and on the other, it was challenged by a firm more committed to the wine commodity chain than itself. Its wavering can be seen in the changing proportions of commission to wine in the post-Napoleonic War period.
Between 1812 and 1840, the proportion rose from the prewar 2.5 percent to almost 9.5 percent, indicating that Offley & Co. was more involved in importing than at the height of its power. By 1832, Offley had lost its position as the largest private exporter, to be replaced by one of the third kind of trader, who had little interest in extended networks and no distractions from imports. Quite distinct from the exporters that dominated in the eighteenth century, these firms devoted themselves to the specificities of the port trade rather than to the generalities of unspecified or diversified trade. They mostly refused to be distracted by larger networks that could be spun out from Porto or even by the relatively light demands of import trade. As will become clear, they were instead linked to dedicated agents in Britain who were able to order extensive amounts of wine and to dedicated suppliers in Porto and the Douro who were capable of providing the volume to meet these orders. 46 Such development along the chain suggest that increasing commitment to the chain was rewarded by increasing success while the diversified network practices, that had dominated in the past, were not. One year alone suggests that some Portuguese had sufficient capital for stock holding, the capitalintensive part of the trade, while the two together suggests there were several portugûeses holding stocks more or less at this level. This assumption gets support from testimony before a parliamentary committee in the 1850s in which a partner in a British firm reported that individual Portuguese stockholders had between 10,000 and 15,000 pipes of wine on hand for ready supply. 51 Indeed, British firms entering the trade relied both on these stocks and the long-term credit that often went with them to overcome the limits of their own meager capital. In all, it seems to have been less capital than outlets for capital--links in an established chain--that the Portuguese lacked in comparison to their British counterparts.
Principally, portugueses faced significant difficulties at the consumption end of the trade, in Britain. Navigation Acts and a significant extra duty put foreign importers at a financial disadvantage.
Moreover, unlike the British in Portugal, the Portuguese in England had no special privileges so were prey if not to the Inquisition (as the British had been in Portugal) then at least to suspicion, anti- This overall lock on the British part of the chain led also to a body of Portuguese brokers in Porto.
Unlike the Douro brokers, these traded on their financial capital as much as their local knowledge: it is they who are represented in the lists of stock holding mentioned above. Again, unlike the Douro brokers, the city brokers traded on their own account. They bought, however, not to export but to sell to exporters when the latter's stocks ran low. Providing a reserve supply of wine to cushion the trade, such brokering overcame the limitations for the British of the Companhia's spot market, the limitations of British capital, and the limited outlets available for the Portuguese. 53 By selling wine that had been aged and was ready for drinking, they also overcame limited abilities among the exporters to judge the potential of young wines. These brokers also provided another means to discipline both the lavradores and the comissários of the Douro. In 1825, for example, when the wine on offer at the fair proved unsuitable, the exporters bought little in the Douro but returned to Porto, where, one merchant reported, 8,000 pipes changed hands. 54 For many Portuguese merchants, then, it was no doubt wiser to work in the lucrative secondary market in Porto than to set up as a primary exporter. They took on themselves much of the risk and skill of aging wine--and they charged for it. These broker firms were owned by some of the principal Portuguese merchants of the day, who grew immensely wealthy from this business.
As with the brokers in the Douro, we have a group of people not visible in canonical views of the chain that leads from production to consumption, but whose participation is critical to maintaining both the strength and suppleness of that chain. 55 Again, as with the Douro brokers, the city brokers challenged the Companhia's regulations and undermined its power. Nonetheless they too played an essential part in holding the chain together. Like the Companhia, the ingleses looked on these brokers, who could drive Portuguese agents, see Alfredo Ayres de Gouvea, "Apontamentos sobre a Famila de João Allen (1698 -1948 ), Boletim Cultural, Camara Municipal do Porto, 21 (1958 ), 390-532 & 22 (1959 , 235-320. (I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this reference.) 53 Several of these brokers registered as exporters to gain the preferential access granted to exporters at the wine fair, but then only exported nominal amounts of wine--enough to satisfy the registration requirement. 54 AAF: Offley & Co. letterbook, Offley & Co. to Offley Brothers Forrester, London, March 29, 1825. 55 To some extent, these city brokers--more than their Douro counterparts--resemble Burt's entrepreneurs who exploit "structural holes" in the network. Burt's work suggests that brokers are relatively independent of the network and by metaphorically rising above the chain, see and enact opportunities to transform it. Circumscribed by they were by regulation in Portugal and informal (xenophobic) institutions in Britain, the city brokers were not so free and acted more to maintain than to transcend the chain. If, however, the brokers were not as free, the chain was not as rigid as Burt's work might suggest. See Ronald L. Burt, Structural Holes (Cambridge, MA, 1992) .
up prices in the Douro, with ambivalence. They disdained them as "speculators," perhaps the ultimate insult from a steady trader.
56 And yet the ingleses depended heavily on these brokers, as they did on the comissários, to overcome their own limitations.
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Britain
As with the Douro, the part of the port supply line in Britain can look a little more like the frayed end of a cord than the final link in a chain. To transfer liability for the heavy import duties directly to the buyers, exporters in Porto sent most British-bound wine directly to innumerable wine merchants and retail outlets spread throughout the country rather than to corresponding houses. Offley & Co. sent its annual circulars to about 250 names towards the end of the eighteenth century, which is probably a reasonable approximation to its number of outlets. 58 Though these last links were diffuse, they were not formless. Both internal and external forces were at work to shape them. From the beginning of port's reign, outlets were increasingly tied to the port commodity chain by its growing popularity among consumers. Towards the end, by contrast, the chain had to fight to tie in outlets that were starting to stray.
As the wine passed most of them by, the corresponding houses may hardly seem to be critical to the commodity chain. Yet, like the Douro brokers, they were essential, principally as communication gateways. Working as commission agents, these gathered orders from the retail outlets, which they relayed on to Portugal. Through these correspondents and their agents around the country, the exporters Co., could drop the wine business with indifference. It seems reasonable to assume, furthermore, that the 56 If we recall Smith's account of the "speculative trader" as one who: exercises no one regular established or well-known branch of business. He is a corn merchant this year, a wine merchant the next. (Smith, Wealth of Nations, 114), most Porto brokers were not "speculators" in this sense. They were, indeed, wine merchants from one year to the next. It would seem that the ingleses were evidently using the term primarily as an insult. 57 The Companhia discouraged the Porto brokers, probably because it too sold wine to understocked ingleses. 58 Records of these scattered outlets have been hard to find and what follows comes primarily from the records of those who shipped wine to them or from alternative sources such as newspapers, advertisements, and novels.
knowledge of the trade that these correspondents conveyed to Porto was limited by the extent of their engagement in the trade. By contrast, the correspondents of both Sandeman & Co and Cockburn & Co did work in wine. Indeed, both these Porto houses had been set up by firms that were already established in the wine business in Britain and sought a connection in Portugal that would be tied closely to them.
The London house of Sandeman & Co, whose senior partner established the Porto house on his own, provides a useful example of these tightly tied corresponding houses. 59 Established in 1790, Sandeman (London) at first looks rather like a general trader, albeit with a strong interest in wine. It also dealt in cotton from the Brazils and it wrote shipping insurance. Its income for wine came in two ways.
Initially, it solicited orders for wine around the country. Here it worked at first on behalf of Offley & Co.
and Warre & Co. For this work it charged commission. Over time, the firm also began to order wine for its own account and to establish itself as a London wine merchant. Illustrating how commitment to the port commodity chain had dangers as well as rewards, Rocha
Pinto, after almost fifty years of trading, was bankrupt by 1817. It was clearly important not only to be in the trade, but also to have a position and good connections in a particular chain. The Sandeman houses, by contrast, exemplify the virtues of interdependence within the chain. By 1832, Sandeman (London) had transformed itself from a general trader and agency house into well-established, dedicated merchant at the end of not one, but several wine chains, each linking major producing regions to the major international market of consumption. With port, it had eschewed the conventional networks of its rivals and forged close links to the Douro, close links between London and Porto, and close links to the retail trade. In the process, it had risen with dramatic speed to overtake much longer established but more network-diversified rivals.
Controlling the Chain
By the end of the first third of the nineteenth century, then, port wine came to Britain along an established and relatively stable chain, increasingly dominated by dedicated traders of the sort described above. 63 Part of the chain's stability came from treaties and fiscal and regulatory arrangements stretching back over a century and external to the chain itself. And part came from the commitments to the chain by participants, for whom the more they committed the greater their returns, but equally the greater their dependence on the chain. For the "general traders," loss of the chain would be the loss only of a part of their business and their expertise. For the dedicated port traders, loss of the chain would threaten their financial capital but more significantly perhaps the loss of their less-liquid, long-term investments in 62 Paul Butel and Alain Huetz de Lemps, Histoire de la Société ed de la Famille Hennessy (1765 -1990 ) (Cognac, 1999 . 63 While valuably historicizing the commodity chain, Hopkins and Wallerstein suggest that the level of vertical integration reflects a pattern of long economic waves during which, during phases of expansion, chains become more integrated and during contraction less so. As the period under discussion here is longer than the phases of the Kondratieff cycle that they have in mind, this does not seem a particularly apposite explanation.
social and human capital--in the hard-won social relations and painfully acquired specialist knowledge that were embedded in the practices of this particular trade, rather than trading in general. Consequently, if the external supports were to slip away, there would be significant incentive among the committed to maintain the chain by other means. As has already been noted, the favorable external arrangements did 
A crisis of quality
Traders working along this chain also faced a significant consumer crisis. As port lost its political and patriotic significance and came to represent unimaginative tradition, a new generation of sophisticated consumers grew familiar with the premium wines of France. 66 At the same time, the expanding wine market resulted in naive drinkers being led astray by aptly named "sophisticated wines"--wines adulterated and falsified in one way or another. Falsification and fabrication are inherent to the wine trade. Indeed, the Oxford English Dictionary's first citation for port discusses wine from Bordeaux that was taken to England via Porto in 1692 in order that it might be entered on the ship's manifest as port.
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The Companhia had to a certain extent helped ensure that only wine grown in the Douro (or wines close enough in character that they could masquerade as such) could leave Portugal as port, while, given the wine's preferential duties, customs officers in England tried to control what could enter under that name.
As controls fell away and duties equalized, it was much easier to falsify and fabricate this premium wine.
From the south coast of France to back alleys around the London Docks, all sorts of concoctions were labeled "port" not only by people outside, but also by people within the chain. Its reputation inevitably fell. For the trade to survive, it was important that some means were found to discipline the attenuated chain stretching from the Douro to Britain, and given the loss of external supports, those means came, as they had to, from within. As they emerged, they revealed previously submerged tensions in the chain.
Participants at the different canonical points struggled over who could provide consumers with the best 64 As note 13 indicates, the Portuguese government tried to revive the Companhia, but the old regulatory powers that had been so effective were never fully restored. (London, 1836) . 67 Oxford English Dictionary, "port" n. 7a .
guarantee of quality for the particular chain in which they were involved. As quality was signaled principally through names and the reputation that accrued to them, the struggle was very much a struggle about trade names.
Traditionally wine had been identified in the English market by its country or region of origin-- sales (and the trend in advertising suggests it did), it also ceded authority to earlier points in the chain.
Highlighting their suppliers' names, the wine merchants were subordinating their own. With Sandeman's name as a warranty, consumers, rather than shopping at Hedges & Butler's, might now shop for Sandeman's, wherever it could be found. Rising from obscurity to prominence, these new names disturbed the established balance of power of the old chain and set link against link.
As they saw their names subordinate the formerly dominant British retailers downstream, the exporters also discovered that the way port was made helped resist subordination by all but the most powerful producers upstream. Most port that reached Britain was a blend of the output from several lavradores. The process of blending dissolved the name of the supplier while giving authority and distinction to the name of the exporter who did the blending. 76 Sandeman's 1834 was distinct from
Offley's 1834 because Sandeman had blended it. Those who liked Sandeman's blend could not get it from other houses or lavradores. Whose wine went into Sandeman's blend was generally unknown.
Occasionally, however, Sandeman would find it expedient to acknowledge who its supplier was and to ship their wine without blending. In so doing, Sandeman was ceding power to those named lavradores.
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But Sandeman rarely ceded such power. Rather, it used the power ceded to it by wine merchants to become one of the most aggressive branders in the wine trade, fighting publicly and aggressively against anyone who it believed was challenging not only the Sandeman brand, but also the integrity of the Porto In sum, as the institutions that helped construct the port wine supply chain crumbled, actors in the chain itself--faced not only with their "disestablishment" but with aggressive competition from, principally, champagne, burgundy, bordeaux, and sherry--struggled for their own collective survival.
Collective danger did not produce a cooperative response, however. Rather it revealed internal tensions around names and trademarks, which the courts in Britain and eventually Parliament were increasingly willing to protect. 79 Brands became a means for one firm in the chain to subordinate, in a quasihierarchical fashion, others that they did not own. The rise to prominence of the Porto houses represents a significant shift in signifying power. This had previously rested almost entirely with wine merchants.
Gradually, it shifted down the chain to their historically more reliable suppliers, the exporters, who in turn subordinated their suppliers, the wine makers in the Douro. 
Conclusion: The End of the Port Commodity Chain
For major port traders, their old, extended commodity chain came to an end about the same time, following the profound shift of power to those who had managed to project their trade name into the British market in the period under discussion. The effects of this relocation of power were far reaching.
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the lavradores made small batches of wine which port exporters had blended wine for individual retailers. As they gained skill as much at branding as at blending, exporters abandoned the latter practice. Rather than divide the wine finely according to individual client's tastes, they divided it into broad classificatory tranches to suit the volume of their business. In the process, the wine inevitably became something closer to a generic commodity than the craft-like, individualized product it had been. 81 (September, 2003) : 405-441. 79 The Merchandize Marks Act was passed in 1862, equity and common law courts had shown increasing willingness to acknowledge a right from some forty years before. 80 The development over the century of bottles and labels, of advertisements and marketing campaigns, of crus and vintages and other rituals of classification were all parts of this struggle to accumulate--or to resist--power in wine commodity chains. 81 Because it was individually blended, port was not divided into types of wine as late as the 1850s See testimony of Joseph James Forrester in House of Commons, Minutes of Evidence. Only by the 1870s A second effect followed from the first. The chain had to some extent been saved by the deployment of brands. But as these also led to more standardized processes and products, the specific, highly local and divided knowledge, which the chain had served to link, became less essential to the trade. To produce a standardised product in high volume, exporters integrated back into production, replacing local, specialized knowledge with more generic, manageable skills. The effects of this change were felt along the chain. In the aftermath of the Portuguese Civil War, exporters began to lease properties in the Douro, in part to grow grapes, but more significantly to make wine to their own specifications. Douro lavradores, once wine makers of distinction, were reduced to grape growers.
Small farmers were increasingly marginalized and, in the hard times of the 1850s and 1860s, many of their properties were absorbed into larger estates producing grapes under contract for exporters and Porto wine brokers. In the process, comissários lost both their power and their independence. Their role was replaced by salaried managers of Douro operations, who were in turn managed from Porto. 82 Soon after, houses in Porto began to suffer a similar loss of independence. Once relatively autonomous, they were integrated into London houses, which were able to centralize operations with the aid of the telegraph while they clung on to and strategically wielded the Porto brand. 83 In all, the means that had been found to stabilize the threatened commodity chains of major export houses were ultimately the means that ended them. Concentrating in London power that was once distributed along the chain and simultaneously devaluing locally specific knowledge that the chain had articulated, brands helped bring about the vertical integration of the commodity chain in a period of intensifying competition.
Socially embedded, enduring trade networks provide an important alternative analytical tool to the neoclassicists' idealised, atomistic markets. But in their turn, networks too have perhaps become over idealized. This essay has tried to show how the trade in port wine to Britain, once dominated by general traders who worked in broad networks, was transformed by dedicated specialists, whose success in the port business can almost be measured by the degree to which they extracted themselves from diverse trading networks. 84 They focussed, instead, on a set of activities "clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another," which is how Gereffi defines a do the modern classifications of "vintage" and "tawny" port appear. Communication (Toronto, 1951) . One of the early symptoms is the port trade is probably the disappearance of family members as the heads of Porto houses. 84 As this argument suggests, commodity chains may be more capable of transformation than some discussions of network "reproduction" indicate and that participants may be more committed to the survival of the networks than to stability. See Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, & Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes, and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science 8 (1997): 109-125.
"commodity chain," a highly specialized kind of network. 85 The essay has tried to explore why this more linear focus rose to prominence. It suggests that the critical factors involved questions of quality--a central and centrally contentious issue for the wine business--and the specialized knowledge required to produce quality in unstable yet highly regulated circumstances. 86 The development of the port trade also highlights the question of power in commodity chains. Overtime, different links in the chain sought either to dominate the chain or, at least, to prevent themselves from becoming dominated. Even the nature of the commodity--a fortified wine--reflects this struggle, but the struggle is clearest in the brand war that broke out along chains as much as between them in the nineteenth century and which, by concentrating power, marked the final stage in the progress through network then chains to vertical integration. 
